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Realist	Avenues	to	global	International	Relations	
	
Abstract	
Realism has long been the focus of global IR’s criticism, but the former can contribute to the 
latter and thereby improve explanations of international relations. Global IR criticizes that 
realism supposedly applies universally, sidelines non-Western perspectives, and 
misunderstands much of foreign policy, grand strategy, and international affairs. Reviewing 
global IR’s case against realism, however, exposes avenues for realism to complement global 
IR. Realism can contribute to a more global understanding of international relations through 
its most recent variant: neoclassical realism (NCR). This newest realism allows for 
contextualization and historicization of drivers of state behavior. It can embrace and has 
already been engaging global questions and cases; global thought and concepts; and global 
perspectives and scholarship. Mapping 149 NCR publications produced by 96 scholars reveals 
a slow shift in knowledge production away from North America towards Europe and to a lesser 
extent Asia and Africa. Creative research designs and scholarly collaboration can put realism 
in fruitful conversation with global IR. This has implications for theory building and inclusive 
knowledge production in realism, global IR, and the wider discipline. Only when we discover 
new avenues for realists to travel can they contribute to a more global IR. In turn, if global IR 
scholars engage realism, they may be better able to address the Western versus non-Western 
dichotomies they challenge. 
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Introduction	
Realism	in	International	Relations	(IR)	has	spurred	investigations	into	the	nature	of	anarchy,	conflict,	
state	behavior,	 and	balance	of	 power	 as	much	as	 it	 has	 invited	 criticism.	 This	 holds	 especially	 for	
neorealism,	 which	 has	 attracted	 criticism	 of	 its	 assumptions,	 concepts,	 and	 evidentiary	 record.	
Particularly	scathing	critiques	have	been	formulated	by	scholars	associated	with	global	IR	(Acharya,	
2014;	 Acharya	 and	 Buzan,	 2019;	 Chakrabarty,	 2000;	 Clapham,	 1996:	 3–4;	 Dunn,	 2003:	 11–12;	
Grovogui,	2006:	43–47;	Hobson,	2012;	Krishna,	2001;	Shilliam,	2010;	Tickner	and	Smith,	2020).	These	
scholars	 criticize	 realism’s	 claim	 that	 its	 knowledge	 applies	 universally:	 across	 time,	 culture,	 and	
geographical	space.	They	argue	that	realism	results	from	and	reproduces	a	Western-centric	mode	of	
knowledge	production	(Buzan,	2016;	Hobson,	2012:	188;	Ling,	2014:	12;	Schmidt,	2014:	468;	Thakur,	
2015;	Tickner,	2013;	Tickner	and	Smith,	2020).	They	maintain	that	realism	fails	 to	explain	much	of	
international	 relations,	 silences	 alternative	 perspectives	 and	 voices,	 and	 does	 not	 grasp	 origins	 of	
conflicts	and	the	behavior	of	most	members	of	the	international	system.	Therefore,	when	global	IR	
scholars	develop	non-Western	knowledge	of	international	relations,	they	re-open	avenues	of	inquiry	
into	the	dynamics	of	power,	politics,	and	the	international	previously	marred	by	parochial	views.	
Given	 this	 criticism,	 simply	 foregoing	 an	 evaluation	 of	 realism’s	 relevance	 for	 global	 IR	 is	
unsatisfactory.	If	realists	ignore	global	IR,	they	overlook	opportunities	to	develop	better	knowledge	
and	to	contribute	to	a	vast	new	body	of	research.	In	turn,	 if	global	IR	scholars	ignore	realism,	they	
reproduce	 the	 very	Western	 versus	 non-Western	 dichotomies	 that	 they	 challenge.	 They	 risk	 that	
global	IR	becomes	another	form	of	parochial	knowledge	production.	It	is	thus	important	to	examine	
where	realism	can	contribute	to	global	IR,	how	realism	relates	to	non-Western	IR,	and	what	this	means	
for	IR	theory	and	methodology.	Global	IR’s	criticism	focuses	on	realism	(W	Brown,	2006:	125),	meaning	
that	exploring	realist	avenues	towards	global	IR	can	be	read	as	a	hard	case	(on	hard	cases:	Eckstein,	
2009:	118;	King	et	al.,	1994:	209;	Levy,	2008:	12).	Demonstrating	a	way	forward	for	realists	may	thus	
suggest	similar	avenues	for	other	approaches	paradigmatically	open	to	embracing	global	IR,	including	
liberalism	and	constructivism.		
We	explore	avenues	to	global	 IR	through	realism’s	most	recent	variant:	neoclassical	realism	(NCR).	
Neoclassical	 realists	 argue	 that	 they	 can	 explain	 foreign	 policy,	 grand	 strategy,	 and	 international	
politics	that	a	more	parsimonious	neorealist	account	cannot.	They	usually	consider	their	contribution	
in	 light	 of	Western	 IR	 (Brawley,	 2009;	Rathbun,	 2008;	Ripsman	et	 al.,	 2016).	However,	 one	major	
challenge	NCR	faces—just	as	realism	and	the	wider	discipline—lies	in	the	Western-centrism	of	most	
of	 its	 produced	 knowledge.	When	we	 re-explore	 realism’s	 origins	 and	 suggest	 that	 NCR	 provides	
avenues	to	develop	global	IR,	we	advance	the	debate	on	realism,	global	IR,	and	the	foundations	of	IR	
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(Acharya	and	Buzan,	2019).	In	a	focused	fashion,	this	reflects	on	broader	theoretical	and	paradigmatic	
divides	that	emerged	recently	in	the	discipline	(Kristensen	2018,	256-257;	Whyte	2019).	
In	this	article,	we	propose	a	new	research	agenda	to	extend	research	on	realism	and	global	IR	in	novel	
directions.	 We	 introduce	 global	 IR’s	 case	 against	 realism,	 specifically	 global	 IR’s	 suggestion	 that	
parochial	knowledge	production	renders	neorealism’s	universalist	claims	analytically	circumspect	at	
best	and	exclusionary	at	worst.	We	turn	 to	 realism’s	newest	variant,	NCR,	and	suggest	 it	provides	
avenues	to	a	more	global	IR.	Mapping	149	NCR	publications	produced	by	96	scholars	reveals	shifts	in	
knowledge	production	away	from	North	America	and	towards	Europe	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	Asia,	
Latin	America,	and	Africa.	We	argue	that	because	NCR	has	a	less	strict	understanding	of	paradigmatic	
boundaries	compared	to	neorealism,	it	can	embrace	global	questions	and	cases,	global	thought	and	
concepts,	and	global	perspectives	and	scholarship.	Its	use	of	unit-level	intervening	variables	allows	it	
to	broaden	its	scope	beyond	the	West	and	take	non-Western	cases	seriously	in	theory-building	(not	
only	testing).	It	is	open	to	reconsidering	a	wider	canon	of	non-Western	scholarship	to	conceptualize	
decision-making	processes	and	state	behavior.	Finally,	we	suggest	how	creative	research	designs	and	
scholarly	collaboration	can	put	NCR	in	fruitful	conversation	with	the	global	IR	literature.	In	doing	so,	
NCR	can	contribute	to	diversifying	disciplinary	approaches	to	core	concepts	of	IR.	In	the	final	section	
we	address	implications	for	theory	and	knowledge	production	in	the	NCR	and	global	IR	literatures	and	
in	the	social	sciences.	
Global	IR	and	the	Critique	of	Realism	
Global	IR	scholars	aim	at	displacing	Western	IR’s	intellectual	hegemony	in	the	discipline	“by	placing	it	
into	a	broader	global	context”	 (quoted	 from	Acharya	and	Buzan,	2019:	303;	also	see:	Waever	and	
Tickner,	2009:	17).	Global	IR	scholars	have	long	argued	that	neorealism	in	particular	is	deeply	flawed	
because	it	provides	a	structural,	universalist,	and	ontologically	materialist	account	of	patterns	of	state	
behavior.	Neorealism	claims	validity	across	 time,	culture,	and	space.	 It	 thus	naturalizes	 the	West’s	
problems,	concepts,	and	historical	experiences.	Hobson	suggests	that	realists	develop	a	framework	
“grounded	within	 a	Western	 parochial	 analysis	 of	world	 politics,	wherein	 intra-Western	 politics	 is	
presented	as	world	politics”	(Hobson,	2012:	188).	It	fails	to	historicize	and	contextualize	adequately	
the	state,	power,	anarchy,	and	conflict.	This	leads	to	“subliminal	eurocentrism”	(Schmidt,	2014:	468).	
Neorealism	can	be	read,	 therefore,	as	an	output	of	colonial	and	postcolonial	modes	of	knowledge	
production	(Guilhot,	2014;	Ling,	2014:	12).	It	has	developed	largely	as	an	Anglo-American	academic	
endeavor	when	the	US	was	uniquely	powerful	(Acharya	and	Buzan,	2019;	Hoffmann,	1977;	Hurrell,	
2016:	3–4;	Vitalis,	2015).		
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This	 Western-centrism	 of	 neorealism	 is	 interwoven	 with	 Western-centric	 and	 elitist	 modes	 of	
knowledge	 production.	 Neorealism	 remains	 one	 of	 IR’s	 most-known	 and	 broadly	 received	
frameworks.	Interrogating	alternative	lenses	might	even	require	a	re-definition	of	the	parameters	of	
the	discipline.	Neorealism	is	thus	argued	to	exclude	and	silence	voices	that	interrogate	culturally	and	
historically	 divergent	 processes.	 It	 eradicates	 culturally	 or	 historically	 divergent	 experiences	 and	
makes	the	world	fit	with	its	framework	(Acharya,	2016;	Acharya	and	Buzan,	2007;	Chakrabarty,	2000;	
Shilliam,	2010;	Tickner	and	Waever,	2009).	Neorealism	describes	international	relations	in	universal	
terms	of	power,	capabilities,	and	black-boxed	states.		
If	global	 IR	scholars	simply	asked	realism	to	diversify	with	non-Western	scholars	and	non-Western	
cases,	neorealism	might	well	constitute	an	avenue	to	global	IR.	After	all,	neorealism	is	widely	used	by	
non-Western	 scholars	 and	 applied	 to	 non-Western	 cases	 (Farhi	 and	 Lotfian,	 2012:	 125–134;	 Nau,	
2012:	22;	Shambaugh	and	Xiao,	2012:	51-54;	also	see:	Deng,	1998;	Escudé,	2015;	Rajagopalan,	1999;	
Resende-Santos,	2007;	Yang,	2013).	However,	global	IR	scholars	suggest	that	even	if	neorealism	thusly	
diversifies,	 it	still	reduces	the	role	of	the	non-Western	neorealist	to	a	technician	who	must	employ	
correctly	and	test	empirically	theory	developed	elsewhere.	As	Mamdani	writes,	“colonialism	brought	
with	it	the	assumptions	that	theory	is	the	product	of	Western	tradition	and	that	the	aim	of	academies	
outside	the	West	is	to	apply	it”	(quoted	from	Mamdani,	2018:	32;	also	see:	Aydinli	and	Biltekin,	2018a:	
3).	Neorealism	fails	to	lend	agency	to	actors	and	to	recognize	cultural	and	historical	divergence	in	its	
causal	mechanisms:	“Realism	falls	like	a	hood	on	all	variations,	across	space	and	time”	(Chatterjee,	
2017:	6).	
One	group	of	scholars	therefore	wants	to	dismantle	realism,	which	they	perceive	as	a	marginalizing	
and	colonial	system	of	thought.	This	group	argues	that	realist	theories	and	concepts	are	foundationally	
problematic	and	must	be	deconstructed	(also	see:	Berenskötter,	2018:	825;	Henderson,	2013,	2017:	
81–82;	Krishna,	2001:	401;	Sabaratnam,	2011;	Seth,	2011).	For	example,	 they	argue	that	concepts	
central	 to	 realism	 such	 as	 ‘anarchy’	 reflect	 IR’s	 Western	 bias.	 Sampson	 suggests	 that	 when	
conceptualizing	anarchy,	Waltz	maintains	“a	particular	conception	of	anarchy—tropical	anarchy—that	
portrays	the	international	system	as	‘primitive’”	(Sampson,	2002:	429).	This	conception	of	primitive	
originates	 in	 a	Western	 colonial	 view	 that	 “[t]he	 anarchical	 world—the	 state	 of	 nature—was	 the	
preserve	of	non-Europeans,	primitive	peoples”	(Henderson,	2013:	85-86).	Seth	and	Sabaratnam	argue	
that	 we	 must	 deconstruct	 problematic	 concepts	 and	 foundational	 myths	 regarding	 IR’s	 origins	
(Sabaratnam,	2011;	Seth,	2011).1	From	this	perspective,	extending	Western-centric	realism	with	non-
	
1	This	foundational	myth	relates	to	the	view	that	the	discipline	of	IR	originated	in	the	West	in	the	interwar	period.	This	view	
suggests	 that	 institutionalization	 occurred	 through	 textbooks,	 chairs,	 institutes	 and	 study	 programs	 in	 American	 and	
European	universities,	all	the	while	“idealists”	and	“realists”	debated	war	and	peace.	Critics	argue	that	this	view	is	a	myth:	
thinking	and	theorizing	on	international	affairs	originated	beyond	the	West	and	predated	the	interwar	period;	and	Western	
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Western	knowledge	is	illegitimate:	it	simply	reproduces	discourses	derivative	of	Western	realism	and	
ignores	those	features	that	are	absent	in	or	challenge	the	Western	canon	(Shahi,	2019a,	also	for	an	
example	on	Arthaśāstra;	Shani,	2008).	
This	group’s	 s	purpose	and	process	of	 theorizing	differs	 from	that	of	 realism.	This	group	theorizes	
ontologically	and	critically:	‘who	constructed	the	notion	of	anarchy,	how	did	they	construct	it,	and	for	
whom?’	They	point	to	the	biased	nature	of	disciplinary	knowledge,	knowledge	production,	and	the	
conceptual	 and	 paradigmatic	 underpinnings	 of	 theoretical	 work	 (Guzzini,	 2013;	 Jackson,	 2010).	
Theorizing	 in	this	way	 is	not	unique	to	global	 IR	or	non-Western	 IR	approaches.2	However,	 it	does	
challenge	key	metatheoretical	assumptions	of	realism.	That	is,	because	realism	is	largely	concerned	
with	explanatory	and	problem-solving	theorizing,	such	as	‘how	do	states	operate	under	conditions	of	
anarchy?’	 Precisely	 because	 explanatory,	 problem-solving	 theorizing	 is	 imperfect	 in	 the	 social	
sciences,	developing	new	avenues	for	explanatory	theory	to	analyze	state	behavior	 is	possible	and	
desirable.	After	all,	“[w]ithout	the	ability	to	verify	or	dismiss	particular	theories,	we	would	have	no	
ability	to	choose	between	theories	to	guide	our	behavior	and	accumulate	knowledge”	(Ripsman	et	al.,	
2016:	106).	
Seeking	to	improve	realist	theorizing	in	such	a	way	requires	proceeding	with	another	group	of	global	
IR	 scholars.	 This	 group	 suggests	 that	 global	 IR	 “subsumes,	 rather	 than	 supplants,	 existing	 IR	
knowledge–including	well-known	 theories,	methods,	 and	 scientific	 claims”	 (quoted	 from	Acharya,	
2014:	650;	also	see:	Acharya	and	Buzan,	2019;	Tickner	and	Smith,	2020).3	Global	IR	does	not	call	for	
theoretical	tribalism	where	new	perspectives	fight	Western	lenses.	This	group	aims	to	develop	and	
build	onto	its	critique	in	productive	ways.	It	asks	scholars	to	reconsider	Western	core	paradigms	and	
approaches	 to	 international	 relations,	 including	 realism.	 Realists	 must	 therefore	 “look	 beyond	
conflicts	 induced	by	national	 interest	and	distribution	of	power	and	acknowledge	other	sources	of	
agency,	including	culture,	ideas,	and	norms”	(Acharya,	2014:	650).	This	means	that	when	we	explain	
state	behavior,	we	can	insist	on	the	continued	causal	 importance	of	anarchy,	structural	 incentives,	
and	the	relative	distribution	of	material	power	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	relevance	of	subjectivity	and	
agential	drivers	of	non-Western	states	on	the	other	(Hurrell,	2016:	11).		
	
texts	and	institutions	overlooked	and	actively	excluded	contributions	from	non-Western	counterparts	(on	the	origins	of	the	
discipline	of	IR	and	its	foundational	myths,	see:	Ashworth,	2014;	Biersteker,	2009;	de	Carvalho	et	al.,	2011;	Long	and	Schmidt,	
2005;	Schmidt,	2002;	Thakur	and	Vale,	2020;	Vitalis,	2015).	
2	 For	discussions	of	 the	prevalence,	 assumptions,	 and	differences	 in	 theorizing	 international	politics	 and	 state	behavior,	
including	in	Western	approaches	to	IR	critical	of	realism,	see	for	example:	Berenskötter	(2018),	C	Brown	(2013),	Cox	(1981),	
Dunne	et	al.	(2013),	Guzzini	(2013),	Jackson	(2010),	and	Keohane	(1988).	
3	Considerable	debate	exists	on	this	issue	within	the	global	IR,	non-Western,	postcolonial	and	de-colonial	literatures.	Critics	
have	 suggested	 that	 global	 IR	 thusly	 understood	 may	 suffer	 from	 or	 reproduce	 biases	 similar	 to	 the	 Western-centric	
scholarship	it	challenges	(see	W	Brown,	2006).	
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Neoclassical	Realism	and	Global	IR	
This	 reading	 of	 the	 global	 IR	 literature	 raises	 the	 following	 questions:	 Can	 realists	 address	 and	
contribute,	 from	within	their	paradigm,	to	the	 intellectual	debate	around	the	discipline’s	Western-
centrism?	Can	realist	theorizing	and	analysis	benefit	from	this?	If	so,	how	and	through	what	avenues?		
Some	global	 IR	 scholars	have	observed	 that	new	realist	variants	 such	as	NCR	have	become	“more	
relevant	to	the	non-Western	world”	because	they	draw	insights	from	it	(Acharya,	2014:	650).	As	such,	
realist	 insights	 continue	 to	 matter	 for	 the	 study	 of	 international	 relations	 (Schmidt,	 2014:	 468).	
Through	 colonialism	 as	 much	 as	 through	 globalization	 and	 associated	 processes	 of	 (forced	 and	
voluntary)	socialization,	formerly	firmly	Western	patterns	of	state	behavior	have	spread	across	the	
globe.	There	 is	 then,	at	a	basic	conceptual	 level,	a	case	to	be	made	for	 the	continued	 inquiry	 into	
notions	such	as	power,	anarchy,	and	balance	of	power	from	a	realist	perspective.	How	realists	describe	
patterns	 of	 state	 behavior	 originated	 in	 a	Western	 canon,	 but	 these	 patterns	 are	 not	 exclusively	
Western	anymore	(Schmidt,	2014:	468).	
Realism	provides	appropriate	and	generalizable	first-cut	theories	into	dynamics	of	global	international	
relations,	because	concepts	such	as	anarchy	matter	beyond	the	West.	The	experience	of	anarchy	is	
shared	across	the	globe	in	the	contemporary	system	of	states,	 if	to	differing	degrees	(Acharya	and	
Buzan,	 2007:	 288,	 293,	 2019:	 303;	Waltz,	 1979).	 Anarchy	 is	 here	 understood	 as	 the	 absence	 of	 a	
“higher	ruling	body	in	the	international	system”	(Mearsheimer,	2003/2014:	30).	If	the	system	of	states	
is	structured	by	anarchy	and	characterized	by	power	and	uncertainty	regarding	other	states’	behavior,	
it	provides	states’	principal	interest	in	survival	and	welfare.	Of	course,	states	differ	in	their	capabilities	
and	 some	 states	 may	 be	 unable	 to	 “at	 any	 time	 use	 force”	 (Waltz,	 1954/2001:	 160).	 And	 yet,	
neoclassical	 realists	 argue	 that	 the	 anarchical	 environment	 is	 less	 strictly	 determinative	 than	
neorealism	suggests:	 it	provides	 leeway	even	for	smaller	states	to	enact	policy	 independently.	The	
experience	of	anarchy	is	also	modified	by	system-level	factors,	and	differently	for	differently	placed	
states.	For	example,	geographic	location,	new	military	technology,	and	the	presence	and	absence	of	
regional	alliances	influence	the	way	the	international	environment	affects	state	behavior	(Ripsman	et	
al.,	2016;	Snyder,	1996).	Finally,	the	experience	of	anarchy	is	mediated	through	domestic	intervening	
variables	 such	 as	 decision-makers’	 perceptions,	 domestic	 lobby	 groups,	 and	 resource	 extractive	
capacity	(Dueck,	2009:	139;	Taliaferro,	2006).	
When	 neoclassical	 realists	 complement	 neorealist	 concepts	 such	 as	 anarchy	 with	 domestic	
intervening	variables,	they	borrow	from	a	tradition	that	analyzes	domestic	variables	to	explain	the	
production	of	 foreign	policy,	 grand	 strategy,	and	 international	politics.	Earlier	authors	analyze,	 for	
example,	decision-making	dynamics,	resource	extractive	capacity,	and	policy	preferences	of	domestic	
7	
	
socioeconomic	groups	 (Frieden	and	Rogowksi,	1996;	Gourevitch,	1986;	Gowa,	1983;	Haskel,	1980;	
Krasner,	1977).	Some	authors	writing	in	this	tradition	have	long	interrogated	non-Western	cases.	For	
example,	Skocpol	argues	that	former	colonial	relationships	insufficiently	explain	why	intra-state	social	
revolutions	occur	(Skocpol,	1979).	Domestic	variables	are	also	employed	in	classical	realism.	Classical	
realists	write	that	state	behavior	is	affected	by	domestic	politics	and	public	support	(Carr,	1939/2001:	
85–87,	132–145),	history	and	 ideology	 (Kirshner,	2012),	domestic	 institutions’	 legitimacy	 (Niebuhr,	
1959:	49–66),	decision-makers’	ability	to	mobilize	resources	(Aron,	1966/2009:	52–57),	or	the	quality	
of	diplomatic	staff	(Morgenthau,	1948/1993:	155-158).		
NCR	differs	from	this	tradition	in	its	paradigmatic	assumptions	and	therefore	in	its	causal	mechanism.	
NCR	prioritizes	changes	in	the	systemic	distribution	of	relative	material	capabilities	to	explain	state	
behavior.	It	then	considers	intervening	variables	to	explain	anomalous	foreign	policy,	grand	strategy,	
or	macro-patterns	 of	 behavior.	 In	 so	 doing,	 neoclassical	 realists	 “explain	 political	 behavior	 that	 a	
sparer	 structural	 realist	 theory	 cannot”	 (Ripsman	 et	 al.,	 2016:	 114).	 Further,	 unlike	 some	 earlier	
domestic	politics	approaches	NCR	has	largely	ignored	global	IR.	NCR	has	also,	as	elaborated	below,	
mostly	been	developed	as	an	American	(and	increasingly	also	European)	body	of	knowledge.	
And	 yet,	 NCR	 may	 anticipate	 three	 potential	 flaws	 of	 non-Western	 theorizing.	 If	 non-Western	
scholarship	 is	 perceived	 and	 perceives	 itself	 as	 ‘local’,	 decentered	 knowledge,	 it	 risks	 becoming	
trapped	in	an	exceptionalist	account	of	international	relations.	Such	an	account	limits	itself	to	ideas	
and	orientations	unique	 to	particular	 non-Western	 states	 (Biersteker,	 2009:	 311;	Hurrell,	 2016:	 6;	
Shahi,	 2019a:	 251).	 Certainly,	 there	 is	 ample	 reason	 to	 scope	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 research	
around	 a	 particular	 non-Western	 state;	 in	 fact,	 such	 research	 may	 appropriately	 counteract	 IR’s	
“fetishization	 of	 abstraction”	 (Krishna,	 2001:	 401).	 However,	 when	 scholars	 scope	 their	 research	
around	a	particular	state,	they	may	overlook	potential	for	comparison	and	generalization,	and	even	
risk	losing	the	critical	distance	to	local	practice	and	power	necessary	for	good	scholarship.	This	in	turn	
reifies	difference	within	the	cases	between	carefully	collected	and	contextualized	evidence	on	the	one	
side	 positioned	 against	 a	 one-dimensional	 view	 of	 the	West	 or	 Western	 theory	 on	 the	 other.	 It	
essentializes	Western	as	well	as	non-Western	 IR	and	hinders	 the	development	of	global	 IR	 (Shahi,	
2019a:	254).	When	we	posit	non-Western	experiences	and	scholarship	as	valuable	only	where	they	
differ	from	their	Western	equivalents,	we	reproduce	the	dichotomies	that	global	IR	challenges.	
What	 allows	 NCR	 to	 address	 these	 potential	 shortcomings	 of	 non-Western	 theorizing	 is	 that	 it	
attempts	to	theorize	progressively	and	bridge	materialism	and	idealism	as	well	as	structure	and	agency	
(C	 Brown,	 2013:	 488–489;	 Foulon,	 2015;	 Sears,	 2017;	 C	 Zhang,	 2017:	 291).	 NCR	 offers	 a	 way	 to	
operationalize	non-Western	knowledge	and	 scholars	within	a	 realist	 framework	 that	places	 causal	
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primacy	 in	 the	material	 structure	of	 the	 international	 environment.	 If	 global	 IR	 subsumes	existing	
knowledge	 from	 realism,	 it	 can	 include	 patterns	 of	 geopolitical	 competition,	 security	 threats,	 and	
anarchic	 conditions.	 This	 allows	 scholars	 to	 retain	 some	 of	 the	 theoretical	 and	 methodological	
advantages	of	realism	all	the	while	they	can	explore	contextual	and	local	factors	(Hurrell,	2016:	8).		
This	allows	NCR	to	maintain	a	systemic,	realist	framework	and	complement	it	with	unit-level	variables.	
These	unit-level	variables	differentiate	states,	historicize	and	contextualize	behavior,	and	lend	agency	
to	 decision-makers.	 These	 decision-makers	 are	 tasked	 with	 deciphering	 structural	 incentives	 that	
influence	 their	 strategic	 choices.	 This	 has	 required	 neoclassical	 realists	 to	 move	 away	 from	
neorealism’s	parsimony	and	generality.	NCR	analyzes	explicitly	how	agents	translate	systemic	stimuli	
into	state	behavior,	rather	than	treating	this	translation	process	as	a	theoretically	separate	domain	of	
analysis.	Neoclassical	realists	interpret	the	limitations	that	systemic	incentives	impose	on	state	action	
less	 strictly	 when	 compared	 to	 neorealism.	 They	 argue	 that	 unit-level	 variables	 intervene	 in	 the	
transmission	 belt	 between	 systemic	 incentives	 and	 state	 behavior,	 because	 systemic	 incentives	
provide	states	with	“considerable	latitude”	to	articulate	their	interests:	systemic	incentives	“merely	
[set]	parameters”	for	state	behavior	(Lobell	et	al.,	2009:	7).	In	so	doing,	neoclassical	realists	appreciate	
that	decision-makers’	response	to	systemic	incentives	is	problematized	in	three	ways.	First,		decision-
makers	“may	not	necessarily	 track	objective	material	power	trends	closely	or	continuously”	 (Rose,	
1998:	147).	Next,	decision-makers	may	be	uncertain	how	to	respond	to	structural	incentives	(Kitchen,	
2010;	Wivel,	2005:	361).	Finally,	decision-makers	are	constrained	by	“domestic	political	incentives	and	
constraints”	which	affect	 the	capabilities	 that	governments	can	extract	 from	society	 (quoted	 from	
Dueck,	2009:	139;	also	see:	Christensen,	1996:	11-13,	Lobell	et	al.,	2009:	37;	Rose,	1998:	162;	Zakaria,	
1998:	35–39).		
While	NCR	developed	a	rich	 literature	on	this	basis,	 it	has	created	 its	knowledge	mainly	 in	and	on	
North	America.	To	illustrate	this	point,	consider	the	96	scholars	who	published	149	works	on	NCR	until	
mid-2019.	We	mapped	 this	body	of	 theory’s	 temporal	 and	geographical	distribution	based	on	 the	
authors’	institutional	affiliation	and	empirical	case	studies	(Figure	1;	Tables	1,	2,	and	3).4 		
	
4	We	selected	all	publications	(journal	articles,	single-authored	books,	edited	books	and	book	chapters	published	since	1990	
and	until	June	2019)	with	“neoclassical	realis*”	in	the	title	or	abstract,	and/or	which	we	identify	as	holding	neoclassical	realist	
positions	 (rather	 than,	 for	 example,	 critiquing	 NCR)	 based	 on	 self-identification	 of	 authors	 in	 the	 contribution	 and/or	
employed	concepts	and	frameworks.	We	did	so	via	the	Google	Scholar	database	and	through	cross-citations	to	neoclassical	
realist	work.	We	noted	each	author’s	current	institutional	affiliation	(university	or	other),	state	and	continent.	We	also	noted	
for	each	publication	which	states	were	analyzed	empirically,	for	example	in	case	studies	(if	any).	A	case	study	is	here	included	
when	it	is	defined	as	such	by	the	author	and/or	is	analyzed	by	the	author	in	a	separate	section	in	the	author’s	publications.	
We	excluded	‘doubles’:	we	used	co-authored	publications	only	once	in	our	calculations	for	the	cases.	Cases	on	the	same	
state	are	counted	multiple	times	if	used	in	multiple	publications.	Three	limitations	must	be	noted:	1)	we	only	selected	works	
written	in	English;	2)	the	absence	of	a	worldwide	academic	research	database	prohibits	a	more	comprehensive	search;	and	
3)	there	is	subjectivity	inherent	in	deciding	which	contribution	counts	as	neoclassical	realist.	This	database	is	therefore	not	
9	
	
NCR’s	knowledge	originates	predominantly	from	scholars	based	in	North-America	and	Europe.	Of	the	
96	NCR	scholars	during	1990-2019,	83	are	currently	affiliated	with	or	employed	by	North	American	
and	European	institutions	(Figure	1;	Tables	1,	2,	and	3).	In	the	1990s,	neoclassical	realist	scholarship	
emerged	in	the	US	and	was	developed	by	a	handful	of	North	American	scholars.	This	trend	continued	
during	2000-2009	when	American	scholars	dominated	knowledge	production,	although	Europeans	
started	 to	 contribute	 (Table	1).	During	1990-2009,	most	 case	 studies	 in	NCR	publications	were	on	
Western	states	 (Table	3).	Of	 the	NCR	scholars	who	published	NCR	works	between	2010-2019,	 the	
portion	 affiliated	 in	 the	 US	 decreased	 to	 around	 30%.	 Here,	 the	main	 shift	 occurred	 from	 North	
America	towards	Europe:	the	number	of	NCR	scholars	who	published	NCR	works	between	2010-2019	
and	were	affiliated	with	or	employed	by	European	institutions	increased	over	fivefold.	While	this	intra-
Western	shift	is	notable,	it	underpins	the	criticism	that	NCR	knowledge	production	is	Western-biased	
(Table	1).	
	
Figure	1.	Geographical	mapping	of	NCR	by	author	and	case	studies,	1990	to	June	20195	
Note:	The	figures	presented	in	red	circles	(first	in	the	legend)	represent	the	number	of	scholars	who	have	their	
main	affiliation	or	employer	in	the	respective	continent	and	who	published	NCR	works.	The	figure	presented	in	
the	green	circles	(second	in	the	 legend)	represent	the	number	of	case	studies	from	the	respective	continent	
used	in	neoclassical	realist	work.	The	figures	are	based	on	the	database	for	this	article,	as	outlined	above.	
	
Table	1.	Number	of	scholars	publishing	neoclassical	realist	works	by	continent	of	affiliation	and	per	
decade	
	
suggested	or	intended	to	be	exhaustive	or	to	gate-keep	this	particular	body	of	work,	but	to	offer	a	first	cut	at	illustrating	the	
dynamics	of	knowledge	production	in	NCR.	
5	This	image	is	published	under	the	Attribution-NoDerivs	(CC	BY-ND)	Creative	Commons	license.	
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	 1990-1999	 2000-2009	 2010-2019	 	
North	America	 7	 15	 27	 	
Europe	 0	 7	 41	 	
Asia	 0	 0	 8	 	
Africa	 0	 0	 2	 	
Latin	America	 0	 0	 0	 	
Oceania		 0	 0	 3	 	
Note:	The	table	presents	the	number	of	scholars	institutionally	affiliated	on	the	respective	continent	and	who	
published	in	the	respective	decade.	
	
Table	2.	Number	of	scholars	who	published	neoclassical	realist	works,	per	continent	of	affiliation,	since	
1990	
		 North	America	 Europe	 Asia	 Africa	
Latin	
America	 Oceania	 West	
non-
West	
Number	
of	
authors	
37	 46	 8	 2	 0	 3	 83	 13	
Note:	The	table	presents	the	number	of	scholars	institutionally	affiliated	on	the	respective	continent.	
	
Table	3.	Number	of	case	studies	per	continent,	in	neoclassical	realist	works,	per	decade	
	 1990-1999	 2000-2009	 2010-2019	 Total	
North	America	 4	 15	 32	 51	
Europe	 5	 31	 71	 107	
Asia	 5	 7	 32	 44	
Africa	 0	 1	 2	 3	
Latin	America	 0	 3	 0	 3	
Oceania		 0	 0	 2	 2	
Note:	The	table	presents	the	number	of	case	studies	about	states	in	the	respective	continent	used	in	neoclassical	
realist	 research.	Not	all	neoclassical	 realists	employ	case	studies;	 some	neoclassical	 realists	employ	multiple	
cases	within	one	publication.	
	
Perhaps	more	telling	is	the	slow	shift	that	takes	place	towards	the	non-West.	During	2010-2019,	an	
increasing	 number	 of	 NCR	 scholars	 are	 affiliated	 with	 or	 employed	 by	 non-Western	 institutions,	
especially	in	Asia	(Table	1).	More	noticeably,	the	number	increased	for	case	studies	in	NCR	publications	
that	analyzed	non-Western	cases.	These	non-Western	cases	comprise	especially	Asian,	and,	to	a	lesser	
extent,	African	and	Oceanian	ones	(Table	3).	This	likely	mirrors	an	increasing	preoccupation	with	the	
rise	 of	 China	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 renewed	 superpower	 competition.	 It	 offers	 a	 starting	 point	 to	
consider	how	NCR’s	use	of	intervening	variables	may	contribute	to—and	has	already	started	extending	
research	on—global	IR.	
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Specifically,	we	argue	that	NCR	can	contribute	to	global	 IR	by	providing	a	generalizable	framework	
within	 which	 to	 order	 the	 relative	 causal	 impact	 of	 systemic	 stimuli	 and	 unit-level	 intervening	
variables.	NCR	can	contribute	to	global	IR	because	it	attempts	“to	explain	variations	in	foreign	policy	
over	time	and	space	by	supplementing	the	structural	assumptions	of	neorealism”	(Wivel,	2005:	360).	
NCR’s	intervening	variables	are	not	causally	independent	but	affect	state	behavior’s	timing	and	shape.	
Neoclassical	 realists	 employ	 intervening	 variables	 to	 examine	 the	 influence	 of	 culture;	 identity;	
perceptions;	 regime	 type;	domestic	 constituencies;	 resource	extractive	capacity;	 ideas	and	beliefs;	
alliances	and	strategic	interaction;	and	public	opinion	and	media	pressures.6 		
Due	in	part	to	this	broad	thrust,	NCR	has	developed	into	the	new	orthodoxy	for	realists	(Narizny,	2017:	
155).	However,	NCR	has	also	attracted	criticism	from	within	and	outside	the	approach.	Critics	argue	
that	 NCR	 lacks	 theoretical	 consistency,	 employs	 intervening	 variables	 ad	 hoc,	 and	 theorizes	 in	 a	
regressive	and	degenerative	manner	(Legro	and	Moravcsik,	1999;	Narizny,	2017;	Rathbun,	2008;	NR	
Smith,	2018;	Wivel,	2005:	367–370).	In	response,	NCR’s	advocates	order	their	intervening	variables	in	
two	ways:	One	is	to	systematize	the	 intervening	variables’	 likely	 interaction	and	influence	on	state	
behavior	 (Ripsman	et	al.,	2016).	Another	 is	to	categorize	the	different	 intervening	variables,	which	
highlights	 the	 differences	 and	 richness	within	NCR	 (Onea,	 2012;	Quinn,	 2013;	 Rathbun,	 2008;	 NR	
Smith,	2018;	Taliaferro,	2000;	Wivel,	2005).	It	is	this	richness	that	allows	neoclassical	realists	to	speak	
and	contribute	to	global	IR.	In	the	following	section,	we	outline	how	NCR	can	engage	and	develop	a	
more	global	IR	through	three	avenues:	global	questions	and	cases;	global	concepts	and	thought;	and	
global	perspectives	and	scholarship.	
Global	Questions	and	Cases		
NCR	allows	for	contextualized	analysis	of	intervening	variables	from	global	questions	and	cases.	NCR’s	
intervening	 variables	 are	 rooted	 in	 the	 domestic	 and	 mediate	 the	 global	 material	 environment’s	
impact	on	state	action.	These	intervening	variables	express	elements	of	subjectivity,	hierarchy,	and	
cooperation.	They	may	include	individual,	institutional,	and	socioeconomic	variables	which	mediate	
differently	and	to	differing	degrees	in	different	local	contexts,	periods,	and	scenarios.	For	example,	
the	 effect	 of	 domestic	 norms,	 ideas,	 ideologies,	 identities,	 and	 cultures	 evidently	 depends	 on	 the	
historical	 background,	 institutional	 regimes,	 and	 ideational	 landscape	 of	 the	 state	 in	 question	
(Acharya,	2009;	Dueck,	2004;	Hadfield-Amkhan,	2010;	Kitchen,	2010;	Schweller,	2018).	
	
6	This	 literature	has	developed	since	the	early	1990s	 in	the	works	of,	amongst	others,	Christensen	(1996),	Dueck	(2004),	
Dyson	(2009),	Hadfield-Amkhan	(2010),	He	(2017),	Juneau	(2015),	Kitchen	(2010),	Larsen	(2019),	Meibauer	(2020),	Schweller	
(2018),	K	Smith	(2016),	NR	Smith	(2016),	Steinsson	(2017),	Sterling-Folker	(2009),	Taliaferro	(2006),	Wivel	(2005),	Wohlforth	
(1993),	and	Zakaria	(1998).	
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Neoclassical	realists	have	already	started	to	incorporate	domestic	and	individual	intervening	variables	
from	global	questions	and	cases.	Juneau	considers	how	identity	and	a	status-seeking	regime	lead	Iran	
to	 squander	opportunities	 to	expand	 (Juneau,	2015).	 Sari	examines	how	 leaders	perceive	national	
interests	abroad	and	anticipate	domestic	public	support	at	home,	to	explain	Indonesian	foreign	policy	
vis-à-vis	Muslim	and	non-Muslim	separatist	groups	outside	its	borders	(Sari,	2019).	Moore	writes	that	
political	 identities	 and	 institutional	 regimes	 constrain	 South	 African	 and	 Brazilian	 foreign	 policy	
responses	to	external	threats	(Moore,	2011).	This	leads	emerging	powers	to	adopt	different	policies	
regarding	nuclear	weapons	 (Carpes,	 2014).	Other	 neoclassical	 realists	 explain	Chinese	 foreign	 and	
security	 policy.	 The	 intervening	 variables	 include	 China’s	 nationalism	 (Schweller,	 2018)	 and	 state	
society-relations	(Sørensen,	2013),	its	imperial	history,	and	narratives	around	strong	borders	(Chand	
and	Danner,	 2019:	 416).	 Verma	 analyzes	 the	 interaction	 and	 resource	 policies	 of	 India	 and	 China	
regarding	 oil	 in	 West	 Africa	 (Verma,	 2013).	 Still	 others	 combine	 neoclassical	 realist	 and	 post-
structuralist	 frameworks	 to	analyze	 the	African	 response	 to	 the	2011	Libya	crisis	 (Gelot	and	Welz,	
2018).	And	they	acknowledge	explicitly	salient	roles	of	history	and	culture	within	NCR’s	structural-
materialist	lens	to	analyze	the	Japanese-Korean	quasi-alliance	(Cha,	2000;	Sherrill	and	Hough,	2015).	
This	shows	that	NCR	analyzes	not	only	democracies	or	Western	great	powers.	NCR	can	contribute	to	
studying	great	and	small	powers	beyond	the	West—including	postcolonial	and	authoritarian	states	
(or	a	combination	thereof)	(Balci	et	al.,	2018;	Becker	et	al.,	2016;	Götz,	2017;	Gvalia	et	al.,	2019;	Wivel,	
2016).	
Beyond	intervening	variables	pertaining	to	institutional	configurations	from	global	cases,	a	focus	on	
the	 individual	 characteristics	 of	 decision-makers	 reveals	 their	 individual	 subjectivity	 and	 lived	
experience.	This	affects	decision-makers’	beliefs,	operational	codes,	and	decision-making	styles	(He,	
2017).	 There	 should	 also	 be	 ample	 opportunity	 to	 integrate	 broader	 societal	 drivers	 of	 decision-
making,	 such	 as	 class,	 race,	 or	 gender,	 into	 a	 neoclassical	 realist	 framework.	 This	 invites	 further	
reflection	 on	 the	 assumptions,	 differences	 and	 similarities—as	 well	 as	 compatibility—between	 IR	
paradigms	 such	 as	 realism	 and	 thin	 constructivism	 (Barkin,	 2003;	 Jackson	 and	 Nexon,	 2004:	 338;	
Mouritzen,	2017:	635;	Sterling-Folker,	2002:	75).	
NCR	is	comparable	to	thin	constructivism	regarding	positivist	theorizing	and	bridging	meta-theoretical	
debates	about	structure-agency	and	materialism-idealism;	but	the	two	approaches	differ	in	important	
ways.	NCR	starts	with	variables	pertaining	to	material	reality	before	it	introduces	ideational	variables.	
In	contrast,	thin	constructivism’s	ontological	priority	of	 ideas	over	matter	means	that	 it	starts	with	
variables	pertaining	 to	 ideation	 (Barkin,	 2003:	326;	Meibauer,	 2020;	 Sterling-Folker,	 2002;	Wendt,	
1999).	By	this	interpretation,	NCR	provides	one	path	towards	global	IR	different	from	constructivism.	
Further,	realism	presents	a	harder	case	than	constructivism	when	it	comes	to	integrating	ideational	
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or	social	drivers	of	state	behavior,	and	thus	to	developing	global	IR.	As	suggested	above,	global	IR’s	
criticism	is	directed	mainly	at	neorealism.	Constructivists	may	already	be	quite	willing	to	interact	with	
global	IR	in	terms	of	their	theoretical	and	paradigmatic	predilections.	This	means	that	if	realism	can	
be	argued	 to	provide	plausible	avenues	 towards	global	 IR,	 it	provides	 strong	 inferential	 value	and	
generalizability	for	other	approaches	in	the	discipline.	
When	NCR	considers	 intervening	variables	 from	non-Western	cases,	 it	opens	 theoretical	 space	 for	
bottom-up	 theorizing	 on	 drivers	 of	 state	 behavior	 not	 currently	 captured	 by	 neoclassical	 realists.	
Existing	 intervening	 variables	 might	 pertain,	 as	 outlined	 above,	 to	 parliamentary	 politics,	 media	
pressures,	 lobby	 groups,	 ideology,	 resource	 extractive	 capacity,	 and	 public	 opinion’s	 pressure	 on	
government.	But	these	variables	may	not	be	applicable	in	the	same	way	to	non-Western	cases.	For	
example,	Zhang	argues	that	in	China	rural	residents	take	collective	action	against	their	government	
officials	 through	petitions	which	 the	Communist	party	organizes	 (C	Zhang,	2017:	286).	This	 role	of	
political	 parties	 and	 political	 participation	 differs	 between	 different	 states,	 regimes,	 levels	 of	
government,	and	policy	contexts.	And	these	differences	may		not	be	captured	by	existing	variables	
and	causal	mechanisms.	When	scholars	employ	non-Western	cases,	they	need	not	use	them	simply	
to	apply	NCR	(although	that	already	usefully	broadens	the	comparative	range	of	cases).	Rather,	when	
scholars	investigate	non-Western	cases,	they	can	develop	new	variables	that	emanate	from	the	case’s	
local	 context.	 Such	 new	 variables	 complement	 existing	 NCR	 variables	 and	 address	 issues	 where	
existing	NCR	theorizing	is	“thin”	(Acharya	and	Buzan,	2017:	364).	Scholars	can	use	non-Western	cases	
to	inductively	develop	new	variables	currently	overlooked	by	NCR	(for	a	similar	point,	see:	Aydinli	and	
Biltekin,	2018b;	Diez,	1999).	After	all,	for	theory	to	perform	well,	the	causal	stories	underpinning	it	
must	reflect	empirical	reality	(Mearsheimer	and	Walt,	2013:	433).	A	more	global	NCR	better	describes	
the	diverse	empirical	realities	at	play	in	international	relations.	
At	 this	 stage,	 two	 caveats	 must	 be	 made.	 First,	 when	 neoclassical	 realists	 integrate	 intervening	
variables	from	non-Western	cases,	they	cannot	lend	variables	other	than	systemic	stimuli	causal	force.	
Neoclassical	realists	argue	that	international	and	domestic	variables	interact	to	produce	foreign	policy	
choices	 or	 systemic	 outcomes.	 However,	 for	 neoclassical	 realists	 the	 international	 environment’s	
anarchical	 nature	 provides	 the	 key	 impetus	 for	 state	 behavior.	 Second,	 neoclassical	 realists	must	
carefully	consider	NCR’s	paradigmatic	assumptions.	The	proliferation	of	intervening	variables	in	NCR	
has	already	led	to	charges	of	eclecticism	and	overreach	(Guzzini,	2004;	Narizny,	2017).	However,	NCR	
is	not	an	eclectic	approach	 in	 the	sense	 its	critics	employ.	Neoclassical	 realists	usually	adhere	to	a	
materialist-structuralist	 ontology	 and	 soft	 positivist	 epistemology—that	 is,	 they	 acknowledge	 that	
social	reality	imposes	limits	on	what	can	be	known	and	what	variables	can	be	controlled	(Hadfield-
Amkhan,	 2010:	 11–12;	 Ripsman	 et	 al.,	 2016:	 106).	 Further,	 they	 usually	 assume	 at	 least	 some	
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rationality	in	decision-making	and	state	behavior	(for	example	Juneau,	2015:	220).	Neoclassical	realists	
can	 include	new	 intervening	variables	 from	non-Western	cases	pertaining	 to,	 for	example,	 socially	
produced	ideas	or	cultural	practices	(Sterling-Folker,	2002,	75-77).	However,	this	requires	neoclassical	
realists	 to	 carefully	 conceptualize	 these	variables	 to	avoid	 charges	of	degeneration	and	 regressive	
theorizing.	
Global	Concepts	and	Thought		
An	equally	 important	avenue	of	how	NCR	can	contribute	to	global	 IR	relates	to	NCR’s	openness	to	
broaden	the	canon	of	realist	concepts	and	thought.	NCR	returns	to	classical	realist	writing	on	concepts	
such	as	power,	interests,	morality,	and	the	role	of	the	decision-maker	in	driving	foreign	policy.	It	is	
also	 open	 to	 new	 thought,	 baselines,	 and	 foundational	 texts.	 In	 its	 intellectual	 roots,	 realism	 as	
conventionally	used	and	taught	in	IR	today	originates	in	and	largely	is	a	product	of	Western	thought	
and	the	European	historical	experience.	Realists	frequently	hark	back	to	thinkers	such	as	Weber,	Carr,	
Niebuhr,	 and	Morgenthau.	 And	 yet,	 recent	 scholarship	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 non-Western	
thinkers	and	their	frequently	overlooked	contributions	to	concepts	such	as	power,	force,	statehood,	
and	anarchy	(Acharya,	2014:	648;	Johnston,	2012;	Shilliam,	2010;	K	Smith,	2018;	Tickner	and	Waever,	
2009).	 This	 points	 to	 more	 innovative	 understandings	 of	 what	 thought	 and	 concepts	 constitute	
realism.	Islamic	mirrors	for	sultans	and	Ibn	Khaldun’s	writings	may	be	used	to	interrogate	concepts	
such	 as	 hegemony	 or	 balance	 of	 power;	 to	 examine	 the	 ideational	 influence	 of	 Islam	 and	 Islamic	
society	regarding	sovereignty;	or	to	conceptualize	the	ontological	divide	between	the	international	
and	the	domestic	 levels	 (Blaydes	et	al.,	2018;	Kalpakian,	2008).	 Indian	scholarship	on	 international	
relations	 has	 grappled	 with	 themes	 associated	 with	 realism,	 for	 example	 in	 Kautilya’s	 writings	
(Alagappa,	 2011;	Ollapally	 and	Rajagopalan,	 2012,	 Shahi,	 2019b).	 In	 the	 early	 20th	 century,	 Benoy	
Kumar	Sarkar	contributed	on	utopia,	world	politics,	and	the	balance	of	power	(Sarkar,	1919).	These	
scholars	contribute	to	concepts	and	thought	conventionally	associated	with	classical	realism,	but	they	
do	so	 for	example	through	readings	of	Hindu	scripture.	Yet	other	authors	combine	classical	 realist	
thinkers	 such	as	Hobbes	with	postcolonial	 thought	 to	explain	conflict	 in	 the	 ‘Third	World’	 (Ayoob,	
1997,	2002).	
It	is	not	our	contention	that	non-Western	concepts	and	thought	on	international	relations	and	foreign	
policy	are	a	new	phenomenon.	Instead,	we	argue	that	NCR	is	more	open	than	neorealism—and	more	
open	 than	 a	 misreading	 of	 global	 IR	 might	 suggest—to	 reconsider	 realist	 thought	 and	 concepts	
through	non-Western	foundational	texts.	This	does	not	mean	that	neoclassical	realists	must	relax	their	
commitment	to	soft	positivism.	Rather,	neoclassical	realists	can	integrate	context-specific	and	time-
specific	thought	and	concepts	to	analyze	state	responses	to	systemic	pressures.	And	this	integration	
of	context-	and	time-specific	insights	extends	to	reconsidering	realism’s	foundational	texts.	In	doing	
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so,	neoclassical	realists	allow	non-Western	thought	and	concepts	to	translate	more	directly	and	more	
easily	into	the	discipline.		
Considering	 non-Western	 thought	 and	 concepts	 through	 a	 neoclassical	 realist	 lens	 comes	 with	 a	
caveat.	Where	scholars	reconsider	past	thinkers,	they	must	not	read	them	in	a	simplified,	post-hoc	
manner	but	with	contextual	awareness.	When	ancient	Hindu	texts	analyze	balancing	power,	in	what	
ways	is	their	conception	of	power	similar	to	a	modern	realist?	Just	as	other	IR	scholars,	neoclassical	
realists	should	resist	the	temptation	to	add	authors	to	their	canon	superficially,	to	find	what	they	want	
to	find	(just	in	Sun	Tzu	rather	than	Clausewitz).	This	requires	that	scholars	examine	carefully	how	past	
thinkers	 conceptualize	 concepts	 such	 as	 power	 and	 explain	 the	 inevitable	 limits	 of	 how	 their	
interpretation.		
Global	Perspectives	and	Scholarship	
A	 closely	 linked	 avenue	 of	 how	NCR	 can	 contribute	 to	 global	 IR	 is	 by	 bringing	 regional	 and	 local	
perspectives	and	non-Western	scholarship	to	bear	on	the	analysis	of	international	relations.	To	do	so	
effectively	 necessitates	 scholars	 to	 develop	 creative	 research	 designs	 and	 collaborate	 across	
disciplines	and	area	studies.	This	allows	scholars	to	better	explain	empirical	puzzles	and	conceptual	
questions.	 In	 the	 following	 paragraphs	we	 discuss	 problems	 inherent	 in	 current	 perspectives	 and	
scholarship.	We	discuss	an	example	from	research	about	Chinese	foreign	policy	that	shows	the	merits	
of	NCR	for	global	IR,	and	we	briefly	delve	into	theoretical	and	scholarly	implications.	
Various	studies	on	non-Western	powers	are	conducted	from	a	positivist	and	neorealist	viewpoint,	for	
example	on	China’s	foreign	policy.	However,	postcolonial	scholars	argue	that	Western	analyses	are	
biased	in	their	conception	of	China	as	an	aggressive,	hostile	power	(Vukovich,	2011).	When	neorealists	
examine	how	China	responds	to	Asia-Pacific	security	dynamics,	they	dismiss	first-image	and	second-
image	analyses	of	local	Chinese	dynamics	(Mearsheimer,	2003/2014).	Instead,	we	can	treat	the	non-
West	(here,	China)	not	simply	as	a	study	object	but	as	a	knowledge	source.	In	doing	so,	we	open	a	line	
of	inquiry	for	novel	insights	from	non-Western	centric	perspectives	and	scholarship.	Importantly,	we	
then	explain	non-Western	responses	to	systemic	incentives	better.	Neorealists	assume,	for	example,	
that	China	responds	automatically	and	 in	a	predetermined	way	to	systemic	stimuli.	NCR,	however,	
allows	us	 to	examine	 carefully	China’s	history,	 culture,	 institutional	 setup,	 and	elites’	 views	about	
American	foreign	policy.	A	neoclassical	realist	analysis	might	explain	how	these	factors	interact	with	
China’s	response	to	systemic	incentives	in	ways	unexplained	by	neorealist	approaches.	It	starts	with	
neorealism’s	causal	primacy	of	systemic	incentives	such	as	East	Asia’s	international	environment.	This	
starting	 point	 unites	 neoclassical	 realists	 (Rathbun,	 2008:	 312).	 Then	 it	 examines	 how	 domestic	
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variables	 transmit	systemic	 incentives	and	produce	 foreign	policy	choices	or	 long-term	patterns	of	
behavior	—	including	of	non-Western	states,	be	they	great	powers	or	smaller	states.	
This	 stepwise	 introduction	 of	 global	 perspectives	 and	 scholarship	 encourages	 scholars	 to	 develop	
innovative	research	designs	and	to	collaborate	across	disciplines,	area	studies,	and	scholars	placed	in	
the	West	and	non-West.	 In	turn,	 this	requires	scholars	to	extend	their	networks,	associations,	and	
exchange	 from	 their	 standard	disciplinary	bases.	 Currently,	 such	networks	often	 comprise	 the	US,	
Europe,	and	Australia/New	Zealand	(Kristensen,	2018).	They	might	also	span	states	in	Asia,	Africa,	and	
Latin	America	which	neoclassical	realists	study.	Gvalia,	Lebadnize,	and	Siroky	use	primary	documents	
and	elite	interviews	with	local	decision-makers	to	assess	neorealism’s	and	NCR’s	explanatory	power	
for	Georgian	foreign	policy	(Gvalia	et	al.,	2019).	Korolev	and	Portyakov	investigate	Chinese	and	Russian	
responses	 to	 international	 crises	 in	 respectively	 post-Soviet	 and	 Chinese	 spheres	 (Korolev	 and	
Portyakov,	2018).	Collaborations	along	these	lines	frequently	start	with	a	realist	framework	and	then	
complement	it	with	relevant	area	expertise.		
Such	scholarship	has	far-reaching	implications.	First,	 it	elucidates	how	non-Western	states	respond	
similarly	or	differently	to	similar	systemic	incentives.	It	broadens	the	inquiry	to	examine	how	unit-level	
practices	 translate	 systemic	 incentives	 into	 foreign	 policy	 and	 grand	 strategy.	 It	 is	 based	 on	
coproduction,	 co-authorship,	 and	 innovative	 research	 designs.	 This	 includes	 comparative	 analysis,	
historical	 case	 studies,	 and	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 discourse	 analysis.	 Second,	 it	 facilitates	
knowledge	production	that	better	explains	foreign	policy	and	strategies	of	non-Western	states.	In	that	
way,	NCR	can	address	 issues	concerning	elitist	modes	of	knowledge	production	that	normalize	the	
West’s	 experience	 of	 international	 relations.	 This	 incentivizes	 scholars	 to	 cooperate	 between	
discipline	and	area,	because	local	experts	can	presumably	reproduce	better	those	local	contexts	that	
elucidate	non-Western	states’	responses	to	systemic	pressures.	Such	cooperation	is	associated	with	
greater	innovation	across	research	fields	(Whyte	2019,	440).	Third,	beyond	the	localization	of	existing	
frameworks,	such	scholarship	can	take	seriously	contextual	bottom-up	perspectives	to	theory	building	
(not	only	to	theory	testing).	It	can	reverse	the	disciplinary	one-way	street	that	applies	theory	from	the	
West	 to	 the	non-West.	 That	 is,	 because	 it	 is	 open	 to	 agential	 and	 contextual	 variation	within	 the	
umbrella	of	the	global	and	geostrategic.	This	allows	for	a	global	conversation	as	“an	evolving	debate	
between	scholars,	within	and	across	disciplines”	(Mamdani,	2018:	32).	In	such	a	global	conversation,	
scholars	can	appraise	more	fully	the	respective	roles	of	geopolitical	forces	on	the	one	hand	and	local,	
contextual	factors	and	knowledge	on	the	other.		
We	do	not	suggest	that	contributions	to	a	more	global	IR	must	travel	NCR’s	avenues;	instead,	we	argue	
that	NCR	provides	one	viable	way	to	do	so.	NCR	has	the	scope	and	theoretical	openness	to	engage	
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and	contribute	to	global	IR,	to	encourage	greater	diversity	in	the	sources	of	knowledge	production,	
and	to	inspire	interaction	and	exchange	among	scholars.	From	within	its	paradigm	NCR	can	contribute	
to	global	IR	and	participate	in	the	intellectual	debate	around	the	discipline’s	Western-centrism.	This	
has	implications	for	knowledge	production	and	theory	building	in	the	social	sciences.	
Implications	for	Knowledge	Production	and	Theory	Building	
We	started	with	the	case	against	neorealism	developed	out	of	the	global	IR	literature.	We	proposed	
that	 realism	 provides	 avenues	 to	 explain	 conflicts,	 state	 behavior,	 and	 recurring	 patterns	 of	
international	politics.	These	avenues	allow	specific	and	historicized	explanations	also	of	non-Western	
states	as	well	as	smaller	powers.	Taking	global	IR’s	challenge	seriously	encourages	creative	research	
designs	and	scholarly	collaboration.	This	contributes	to	diversifying	disciplinary	approaches	to	core	
concepts	of	IR.	It	improves	knowledge	production	and	application	in	the	NCR	as	well	as	the	global	IR	
literatures.	And	it	tells	us	much	about	knowledge	production	and	the	performative	aspect	of	power	in	
the	social	sciences.	
On	the	one	hand,	neoclassical	realists	must	embrace	a	broader	understanding	of	agency.	This	includes	
non-Western	 states’	 processes,	 behaviors,	 and	 their	 potentially	 system-wide	 effects.	 Neoclassical	
realists	have,	since	NCR’s	 inception	 in	the	early	1990s,	 focused	on	states’	 foreign	policy	and	grand	
strategy.	More	recently,	some	neoclassical	realists	began	to	develop	a	theory	of	international	politics.	
They	argue	that	individual	states’	grand	strategies	have	system-wide	effects:	what	individual	states	do	
affects	the	international	environment	for	all	other	states	in	the	system.	Thus,	NCR	may	explain	foreign	
policy	(Type	I	NCR),	grand	strategy	(Type	II),	and	systemic	outcomes	(Type	III;	Ripsman	et	al.,	2016).	
Debates	then	center	on	which	political	phenomena	Type	III	explains	and	how	these	phenomena	are	
produced.	 If	 neoclassical	 realists	 want	 to	 develop	 a	 neoclassical	 realist	 theory	 of	 international	
politics—and	not	just	a	Western	variant—they	must	engage	with	and	incorporate	the	many	origins	of	
IR,	 of	 realism,	 and	 of	 its	 core	 concepts.	 If	 they	 fail	 to	 do	 so,	 they	 risk	 perpetuating	 the	Western,	
parochial,	 and	 great	 power	 biases	 that	 permeate	 the	 discipline.	 If	 neoclassical	 realists	 fail	 to	
incorporate	IR’s	many	origins,	they	overlook	the	drivers	and	patterns	of	behavior	of	most	members	of	
the	international	system.	
On	the	other	hand,	 if	global	 IR	scholars	want	to	develop	a	better	and	more	inclusive	IR,	they	must	
avoid	producing	knowledge	in	ways	that	are	disengaged	from	or	supplant	existing	Western	theories,	
concepts,	 and	 methodologies.	 If	 global	 IR	 scholars	 leave	 their	 relationship	 with	 realist	 thought	
underdeveloped,	 they	 risk	continuing	 the	very	dichotomies	between	Western	and	non-Western	 IR	
that	they	challenge.	This	reifies	some	of	the	disciplinary	divides	between	positivist/post-positivist	and	
quantitative/qualitative	research	(Kristensen,	2018:	257;	Whyte,	2019).	
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This	means	that	exploring	realist	avenues	to	global	IR	tells	us	something	about	inclusive	knowledge	
production	in	the	social	sciences.	Knowledge	production,	here	on	realism,	is	what	scholars	do	through	
repetitive	 practice.	When	 realists	 cite	Morgenthau,	 Carr,	 and	 Niebuhr	 (and	 not,	 for	 example,	 Ibn	
Khaldun,	Sarkar,	or	Zhang	Wenmu),	they	may	not	reflect	on	what	the	knowledge	on	realism	is.	Instead,	
they	may	well	follow	what	became	a	performative	act	by	a	dominant	group	of	academics	who	in	turn	
follow	hegemonic	social	conventions	in	the	field	(reified	through	citations,	textbooks,	and	syllabi).	This	
practice	supports	the	status	quo	on	what	knowledge	is	authoritative	and	‘good’.	It	marginalizes	and	
silences	alternative	voices	on	diverse	cases	and	origins	of	knowledge.	
Correspondingly,	contemporary	realists	must	consider	their	positionality.	Neoclassical	 realists	have	
already	undertaken	first	steps	towards	grappling	with	subjectivity,	measurability,	and	reflexivity.	So	
far,	they	have	clarified	limitations	in	positivist	research:	how	social	reality	imposes	limits	on	what	can	
be	known	and	what	variables	can	be	controlled.	Accordingly,	most	neoclassical	realists	uphold	a	soft	
positivist	epistemology	(Ripsman	et	al.,	2016:	105–107).	Yet	some	have	started	to	 interrogate	how	
they	can	combine	NCR	with	post-positivist	and	post-structuralist	approaches	(Gelot	and	Welz,	2018).	
This	goes	some	way	to	heeding	Wæver	and	Tickner’s	warning,	who	write	on	non-Western	challenges	
to	 IR	that	“[w]ithout	epistemology,	we	simply	reproduce	dominant	strains	of	 IR,	only	 in	a	reflexive	
format”	 (Waever	and	Tickner,	2009:	18).	The	next	 step	might	well	 include	 rethinking	carefully	 the	
realist’s	 own	 positionality	 vis-à-vis	 her	 study	 objects	 as	 well	 as	 the	 concepts	 and	 knowledge	 she	
receives,	 produces,	 and	 reproduces.	 As	 Acharya	 and	 Buzan	 write,	 IR	 is	 “a	 two-way	 street.	 IR	 ...	
prioritizes	some	things	over	others,	and	adds	labels	and	concepts	…	that	in	turn	influence	how	people	
understand	the	world	they	are	in	and	therefore	shapes	how	they	act”	(Acharya	and	Buzan,	2019:	7;	
also:	Alejandro,	2019:	3,	10).	This	article	illustrates,	then,	through	the	cases	of	realism,	global	IR,	and	
the	discipline	more	broadly,	how	theory	building	can	engage	with	such	epistemological	questions.	It	
opens	 pathways	 to	 challenge	 dominant	 narratives,	 to	 advance	 a	more	 inclusive	 discipline,	 and	 to	
improve	explanations	of	state	behavior	around	the	world.	
Conclusion	
We	propose	extending	research	on	realism	and	global	IR	in	novel	directions.	Having	introduced	the	
case	against	realism	from	global	IR’s	perspective,	we	propose	how	realism’s	recent	variant—NCR—
provides	avenues	to	engage	and	develop	global	IR.		
The	 case	 from	 global,	 postcolonial	 and	 non-Western	 IR	 against	 realism	 relates	 to	 universal	 and	
ahistorical	claims,	to	denying	agency	to	actors,	and	to	parochial	knowledge	production.	This	means	
that	neorealism	in	particular	may	be	inadequate	to	explaining	the	problems	and	dynamics	of	conflict,	
actors,	 and	 processes	 in	 global	 international	 relations.	 Because	 realism	 is	 the	 focus	 of	 global	 IR’s	
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criticism,	exploring	realist	avenues	towards	global	IR	serves	as	a	hard	case.	If	a	variant	of	realism	offers	
plausible	avenues	towards	global	IR,	it	may	illustrate	how	other	approaches	to	international	relations	
can	engage	non-Western	IR	and	contribute	to	a	more	global	discipline.		
NCR	 is	 a	 recent	 variant	 of	 a	 scholarly	 tradition	 that	 re-introduces	 domestic	 politics	 into	 systemic	
analysis:	a	variant	that	has	largely	ignored	global	IR.	Responding	and	contributing	to	the	growth	of	
non-Western	theories	in	IR	enriches	NCR.	It	opens	NCR	to	considering	and	integrating	global	cases,	
questions,	 thought,	and	scholarship.	This	 is	possible	because	NCR	 is	 less	bound	to	universalist	and	
structural-materialist	 theorizing	 than	neorealism	 is.	NCR	bridges	 structure	and	agency	 in	mid-level	
theory	 and	 reduces	 theoretical	 parsimony.	 It	 is	 rich	 in	 intervening	 variables,	 causalities,	 and	
methodologies,	meaning	that	the	approach	is	well-placed	to	engage	global	IR	insights.	These	insights	
relate	to	the	analytical	importance	of	contextuality	and	placed-ness	(in	time	and	space)	in	a	system-
level	approach.	This	not	only	brings	additional	explanatory	power	and	descriptive	accuracy;	 it	also	
broadens	the	scope	of	potential	inquiry.	It	responds	meaningfully	to	Chakrabarty’s	claim	that	Western	
thought	remains	“indispensable	and	inadequate”	(Chakrabarty,	2000:	16).		
NCR	 allows	 researchers	 to	 incorporate	 mediating	 effects	 of	 intervening	 variables	 pertaining	 to	
domestic	norms,	ideas,	ideologies,	identities,	and	cultures	in	system-level	analyses.	These	intervening	
variables	depend	on	the	historical	background,	institutional	regimes,	and	ideational	landscape	of	the	
state	in	question.	Opening	the	realist	canon	to	non-Western	political	thought	helps	to	grasp	the	roots	
of	 these	 dynamics	 and	 to	 conceptualize	 their	 effects.	 While	 this	 requires	 a	 careful	 reading	 of	
conceptualization	and	meaning	in	non-Western	political	thought,	it	provides	fertile	common	ground	
to	develop	global	perspectives	and	cases	within	an	NCR	framework.	Within	NCR,	local	dynamics	cannot	
replace	 or	 predominate	 system-level	 variables	 as	 causal	 drivers	 of	 state	 behavior.	 Indeed,	 NCR’s	
potential	to	contribute	to	global	IR	does	not	require	relaxing	NCR’s	structural-materialist	ontology	or	
soft	positivist	epistemology.	It	also	does	not	necessitate	loosening	NCR’s	implicit	bounded	rationality	
assumption	in	decision-making	and	state	behavior.	
Mapping	of	96	NCR	scholars	and	149	publications	illustrates	that	NCR	knowledge	production	has	been	
dominated	by	North	American	scholars	but	is	slowly	shifting	towards	Europe	and	Asia.	We	propose	
putting	into	fruitful	conversation	Western	approaches	such	as	realism	with	non-Western	approaches	
via	the	route	of	NCR.	This	encourages	differently	situated	scholars	to	contribute	to	global	IR.	NCR’s	
avenues	 to	 global	 IR	 encourages	 creative	 research	 design,	 scholarly	 collaboration,	 and	 bottom-up	
theorizing.	 NCR	 holds	 much	 potential	 to	 generate	 greater	 insights	 into	 how	 non-Western	 states	
respond	 to	 systemic	 incentives,	 and	 to	 combine	 different	 regional	 expertise	 and	 methodological	
approaches.	In	these	ways,	NCR	opens	new	avenues	of	inquiry	into	the	dynamics	of	power,	politics,	
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and	the	international	previously	marred	by	parochialism.	This	brings	possibilities	for	NCR	to	contribute	
to	a	vast	new	body	of	research.	It	solidifies	NCR’s	relevance	in	a	discipline	that	becomes	increasingly	
critical	of	Western	and	great	power	biases.	Finally,	it	broadens	the	scope	and	deepens	the	quality	of	
analytical	inquiry.	This	improves	NCR	as	a	theoretical	framework.	
Exploring	realist	avenues	to	a	more	global	 IR	should	not	be	read	as	a	reification	of	some	notion	of	
essential	 difference	 between	 Western	 and	 non-Western	 theories.	 Such	 essentialization	 would	
suppose	that	Western	knowledge	is	universal	and	non-Western	knowledge	adds	localized	expertise.	
Of	course,	non-Western	scholars	produce	knowledge	that	claims	universal	applicability.	Some	scholars	
discuss	concepts	and	phenomena	similar—and	even	complementary—to	Western	realism	(cf.	Ayoob,	
1997;	 Balci,	 2015;	 Behera,	 2010;	 Frasson-Quenoz,	 2016;	 Inoguchi,	 2009).	 Others	 offer	 different	
ontologies,	 explanations,	 prescriptions,	 and	 knowledge	 claims	 which	 challenge	 positivism,	
structuralism,	materialism,	and	the	centrality	of	realism’s	core	concepts	(e.g.	Rösch	and	Watanabe,	
2017;	Shahi,	2018,	2019a;	Tieku,	2012;	Tingyang,	2006).	Either	way,	non-Western	scholarship	does	not	
offer	better	knowledge	simply	because	it	originates	elsewhere.	Assuming	that	it	does	would	preserve	
dichotomies	between	Western	and	non-Western	knowledge	and	essentialize	the	latter	in	ways	that	
global	IR	scholars	set	out	to	challenge	(W	Brown,	2006:	128).	When	we	open	NCR	to	global	IR	and	vice	
versa,	we	 contribute	directly	 towards	better	 theory	 in	 general.	As	 suggested	above,	 such	opening	
needs	to	come	with	an	awareness	that	questions	and	concepts	may	not	travel	easily	(Biersteker,	2009:	
324).	 Adequately	 reflecting	 on	 such	 cross-fertilization	most	 likely	 requires	 scholars	 to	 collaborate	
across	fields	of	expertise,	cases,	and	theoretical	orientation.	
Exploring	 new	 realist	 avenues	 to	 global	 IR	 need	 not	 aim	 simply	 to	 “whitewash”	 realism.	 It	 allows	
scholars	to	integrate	insights	from	global	IR	into	a	neoclassical	realist	framework.	However,	realism	
allegedly	creates	and	maintains	parochial	modes	of	knowledge	production.	It	is	argued	to	legitimize	
knowledge	that	normalizes	a	predominantly	Western	experience	of	the	international	as	universally	
valid	and	good	science.	So,	depending	on	one’s	stance	on	this	debate,	is	opening	realism	to	global	IR	
and	vice	versa	a	legitimate	exercise?	A	more	open	version	of	realism,	that	is,	one	that	acknowledges	
and	 integrates	 global	 questions,	 cases,	 and	 perspectives,	 might	 promise	 a	 normatively	 more	
defensible	direction	in	realist	theorizing.7 	We	have	foregone	further	discussion	of	this	question,	not	
because	we	deem	it	unimportant	but	because	it	is	theoretically	and	metatheoretically	separate.	
Exploring	new	avenues	to	explain	international	relations	is	a	prerequisite	for	developing	a	more	global	
IR.	It	allows	a	reconsideration	of	realism	and	global	IR	for	inquiry,	theory,	and	knowledge	production.	
	
7	See	also	C	Zhang	(2017:	291)	and	F	Zhang	(2012:	96-97)	for	an	argument	to	render	realism	more	normatively	defensible,	
focusing	on	Confucian	morality	and	realism.	
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Travelling	these	new	avenues	and	fleshing	them	out	conceptually	and	empirically	should	be	of	interest	
to	realists	in	a	discipline	increasingly	critical	of	Western	bias;	and	to	global	IR	scholars	grappling	with	
the	very	dichotomies	between	West	and	non-West	they	set	out	to	challenge.	
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